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Despite housing's importance to the economy and worries about recent financial and economic turmoil
traceable to housing market difficulties, little has been written on how distress in the housing market,
measured by foreclosures, affects home prices, or how these variables interact with other macroeconomic
or housing variables such as employment, housing permits or sales.  Employing a panel VAR model
to examine quarterly state-level data, our paper is the first to systematically analyze these interactions.
There is substantial regional variation across states, which facilitates our ability to identify linkages
among variables. Importantly, price-foreclosure linkages work in both directions; foreclosures have
a significant, negative effect on home prices, while an increase in prices alleviates distress by lowering
foreclosures.  Similarly, employment and foreclosures have mutually negative effects on each other.
The impact of foreclosures on prices, while negative and significant, is quite small in magnitude.  We
demonstrate this by simulating house price changes in response to extreme foreclosure shocks.  Even
under extremely pessimistic scenarios for foreclosure shocks, average U.S. house prices, as measured
by the comprehensive OFHEO house price index (which we argue is the most reliable and useful measure
of house prices to use for our purposes), likely would decline only slightly or remain essentially flat
in response to foreclosures like those predicted for the 2008-2009 period. This suggests that home
prices are quite sticky, and that fears of a major fall in house prices, with all of its attendant negative
macroeconomic consequences, typically are not warranted even in extreme foreclosure circumstances.
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  Midway through 2008, the US housing market was widely regarded to be in a 
state of crisis. Housing permits had been in a steady and deep decline since 2006 (a year 
prior to the outbreak of the subprime credit collapse). The collapse in the values of 
subprime mortgages, which began in the middle of 2007, brought with it a substantial 
increase in foreclosures, and unusually large declines in house prices in some states – 
especially in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Nevada. Widespread 
loose mortgage credit – as exemplified by the infamous “liar” mortgages of the 2005, 
2006 and 2007 cohorts – was reflected in unprecedented default and foreclosure rates for 
those cohorts of mortgage originations. After the bursting of the subprime “bubble,” 
many analysts feared that rising foreclosure rates would lead to deep and widespread 
house price declines.   
  In addition to the obvious difficulties that price declines and foreclosures create 
for homeowners and participants in the housing industry, housing has been shown to have 
a major impact on the economy (Leamer, 2007, Green, 1997, Coulson and Kim, 2000, 
Gauger and Snyder, 2003).  Indeed, Leamer (2007) titles his study “Housing IS the 
Business Cycle,” to illustrate the importance that the housing sector has in U.S. income 
fluctuations.   Gauger and Snyder (2003) find that, while always important, the impact of 
housing on the economy has become more pronounced in recent decades.   
  Figure 1 illustrates the possible cause for concern about house price declines in 
the wake of widespread foreclosures. Using data for the 2007 year as a whole, regressing 
price change at the state level on foreclosures growth at the state level (where we use the 
OFHEO sale and refinancing index to measure price, and the Mortgage Bankers 2 
Association quarterly delinquency surveys to measure outstanding foreclosures relative to 
mortgages), we find a close fit between the two series (an R-squared of 0.72). Of course, 
Figure 1’s description of the low-frequency association between price change and 
foreclosures growth says nothing about the causal relationships between prices and 
foreclosures, and should not be interpreted as providing an estimate of the response of 
prices to foreclosure shocks. This regression line reflects a combination of three 
influences: (1) the responses of prices to foreclosure shocks, (2) the responses of 
foreclosures to price shocks, and (3) the responses of both foreclosures and prices to 
shocks originating in other variables.  
We focus our attention in this paper on measuring the size of the effect that 
shocks to housing market distress (foreclosures) have on house prices. To our knowledge, 
ours is the first paper to estimate the impact of foreclosures on house prices for the U.S. 
as a whole, and the first to investigate that question within a dynamic model of housing 
market conditions and the local economy. To estimate the impact of foreclosures on 
house prices, we develop a dynamic model of the housing market at the state level, which 
is capable of disentangling the various contributing influences that explain the low-
frequency association between foreclosures and price changes, and thus allowing us to 
gauge the potential housing-price and macroeconomic consequences of continuing 
mortgage distress. 
Modeling the housing market at the state level is helpful for improving empirical 
identification. Quarterly data on the main housing variables of interest exist for each state 
going back to 1981.  Although there have been only three nationwide housing cycles 
since the 1980s, there have been numerous state- or regional-level cycles, which often 3 
have entailed significant price growth decline and foreclosures. Furthermore, even within 
a given national economic cycle there is wide variation across states in employment 
growth, net migration, and other factors that can affect local housing markets.  As a 
result, there is substantial variation in housing market experiences across states, which 
can be useful for identifying empirical linkages among variables.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature on the 
relationships among home prices, foreclosures and other housing and economic variables. 
Section III presents the results of our estimation model, in which we find a negative, 
significant effect of foreclosures on prices.  The magnitude of this effect, however, is 
small.  This suggests that house prices are quite sticky even in the face of high financial 
distress.  In order to quantify this result in an intuitive way, Section IV develops two-
year, out-of-sample forecasts for house prices − for individual states and for the US as a 
whole − using the model developed in Section III and state-level forecasts of foreclosures 
for the 2008-2009 period kindly provided by Economy.com. We find that even in 
response to an extreme shock in foreclosures in excess of those predicted for this period, 
average U.S. home price declines would be relatively small. This suggests that home 
prices are quite sticky and that fears of a major fall in house prices, with all of its 
attendant negative macroeconomic consequences, typically are not justified even in the 
face of extreme foreclosure shocks. Section V discusses differences in the meaning of 
housing price indices, and their relative desirability for our purposes. Section VI 
concludes.  A detailed description of our data and a discussion of some technical aspects 
of our methodology can be found in the appendix.   
  4 
II. Literature Review 
  Leamer (2007) notes that no macroeconomics textbook contains any lengthy 
treatment of real estate, despite its role as a leading indicator of business cycle conditions.  
Instead, academic studies tend to focus on aspects of the housing market and the broader 
economy in isolation from each other, such as examining the interaction of house prices 
and home sales, but nothing else. Despite the importance of housing to the economy, 
little has been written about the interaction between prices and foreclosures at the 
aggregate level, and to our knowledge nothing has been written that links prices and 
foreclosures dynamically within the broader context of the macroeconomic environment 
and other conditions in the housing market.  This is an important omission when one 
considers that the impact of financial liquidation on measures of prices and output in the 
economy is sometimes quite large, as indicated, for example, by Anari, Kolari and Mason 
(2005).   
  Within the real estate literature, some studies have found important 
interdependencies among various market indicators. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) 
examine the impact of such variables as changes in land value, and financing and 
construction costs on housing starts. Coulson and Richard (1996) investigate the impact 
of severe weather events, such as extreme heat or precipitation, on starts and find an 
effect, although only in the north central region of the U.S.  Coulson (1999) examines the 
time series properties of housing starts and completions, and finds that the two variables 
are cointegrated.  Moreover, the author finds that completions are not much affected by 
factors such as materials costs, income, interest rates, or housing prices.  This finding is 5 
supportive of the idea that once a housing start occurs, completion is a nearly foregone 
conclusion.    
  Several papers have examined the relationship between home prices and other 
variables. Clayton, Miller and Peng (2008) find that home prices and turnover in the 
home market predict each other, but that most of the positive co-movement between the 
two variables is caused by responses to common financial, labor market and mortgage 
shocks.  Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) forecast home prices with population, income 
and interest rate regressors.  The authors find that current fundamentals substantially 
under-predict the recent run-up in home prices.  Neither paper examines the effect of 
financial distress on price movements. 
  Some papers have examined the effect of housing on aggregate economic activity 
as measured by GDP.  Green (1997) examines residential investment and GDP, and finds 
the former Granger-causes the latter. Coulson and Kim (2000) find that residential 
investment shocks are important in predicting consumption and GDP growth. Gauger and 
Snyder (2003) use a vector error-correction (VECM) model and find, as did Green 
(1997), that residential investment has a positive impact on GDP.  Leamer (2007) 
performs a series of estimations and historical decompositions and finds that residential 
investment is the best predictor of future recessions in the U.S. 
  There have been several papers measuring the effect of prices and sales volume 
on each other.  Clayton, Miller and Peng (2008) find that sales and prices have mutually 
positive effects on each other.  The authors find that most of the positive correlation can 
be explained by co-movement of prices and sales in response to other variables.  
Wheaton and Lee (2008), on the other hand, find that price increases predict lower sales, 6 
which is in keeping with standard demand-side stories and contradicts the results of 
Clayton, Miller and Peng (2008), as well as some models of loss aversion and down 
payment constraints which had been advanced to explain the positive sales-price 
correlation.   
  Little has been written about the empirical relationships between foreclosures, or 
other measures of financial distress, and home prices at the macro-level, although some 
have examined how price volatility may affect the probability of default (Foster and Van 
Order, 1984).   
  Recently, a number of studies have used micro data to assess the interaction of 
foreclosures and prices.  Willen, Gerardi and Shapiro (2008), using data from 
Massachusetts, find that the recent decrease in prices was a major catalyst in pushing sub-
prime borrowers into foreclosure.  Examining the opposite direction of causality, Lin, 
Rosenblatt and Yao (2008) use a random sample of about twenty percent of all U.S. 
mortgages, including only those which are conforming, and find that there is a clear 
negative impact of foreclosures on prices of local homes.  However, this effect is much 
larger during a housing downturn than during a boom, indicating the importance of the 
state of the housing cycle for the effects of foreclosures.  Leonard and Murdoch (2008) 
investigate foreclosures in the greater Dallas area, and similarly uncover a negative effect 
of distress on prices, which diminishes as distance from the foreclosed property grows.  
Finally, Rogers and Winter (2008) examine foreclosures in St. Louis county.  They find 
the expected negative impact.  Interestingly, they also find that the marginal impact of 
additional foreclosures actually falls as foreclosures increase, which contradicts the 
proposition that rising foreclosures may have a rising marginal effect on prices.  7 
  Despite the recent increased interest in modeling the relationship between prices 
and foreclosures, illustrated by these papers, our study is the first of which we are aware 
to systematically investigate the interaction of financial distress, housing market 
conditions and the local economy. 
 
III. A Quarterly Panel VAR Model of the State-Level Housing Market, 1981-2007 
We model home prices and foreclosures at the state level, using quarterly data 
since 1981, and treat the growth of home prices and the foreclosure rate as part of a five-
variable system of equations, which also includes the growth rates of employment, 
single-family permits, and existing home sales. We employ a panel vector autoregressive 
model (PVAR), which captures dynamic linkages among all the five variables, which are 
all treated as mutually endogenous.  
The variables are defined as follows: the log difference of seasonally-adjusted 
total non-farm employment, the log difference of seasonally-adjusted existing home 
sales, the log difference of seasonally-adjusted single-family housing permits, the log 
difference of the OFHEO home price index (inclusive of same-home sales and 
refinancings; below, we also discuss results when we employ the purchase-only index),
1 
and the log of the ratio of outstanding foreclosures relative to total mortgages (based on 
Mortgage Bankers Association surveys).  A detailed description of each of the variables 
used in our analysis can be found in the appendix.    
We also ran the model defining foreclosures as the log difference of the ratio of 
foreclosures relative to total mortgages, which produced very similar results. We report 
                                                 
1 As we discuss in more detail below, we believe that including refinancings when measuring price change 
is desirable, because it reduces any bias arising from variation in the types of homes that sell over different 
phases of the housing cycle.  8 
results using the log foreclosure ratio because doing so seems to better capture the effects 
of cumulative financial distress on house prices, as we explain further below.  
All data run from 1981 through the first quarter of 2008.  Due to the forward 
(Helmert) de-meaning of observations used to control for state fixed effects, we lose the 
last observation, and thus our useable sample runs through the fourth quarter of 2007.
2  
After some experimentation with different lag lengths, we found that eight quarterly lags 
encompassed quite well all the significant dynamic relationships among these five 
variables.  The PVAR regression results are shown in Table 1.   
In order to generate impulse responses and variance decompositions, one must 
identify the sources of covariance among the residuals in each of the five equations. We 
follow the existing PVAR literature by employing the Choleski decomposition, which 
models the residuals matrix as a recursive, triangular system. The main advantage of that 
approach is its simplicity: one selects an ordering of variables that posits the degree of 
within-quarter endogeneity among each of the five endogenous variables.  
We experimented with various possible orderings among the five variables and 
found that our key results regarding the relationship between home prices and 
foreclosures were robust to the orderings chosen. We report only one ordering: 
employment, sales, permits, prices, foreclosures. Employment appears first in our 
ordering, since we assume that any correlations between within-quarter innovations in 
employment and the within-quarter innovations in our four housing-sector variables 
reflect the role of employment as a source of disturbance (both with respect to the labor 
market and as a general macroeconomic barometer).  
                                                 
2 We follow Love and Ziccino (2006) in our methodology for Helmert de-meaning.  This process was first 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).   9 
Foreclosures are placed at the end of our ordering because foreclosure reflects the 
strategic decisions of borrowers and lenders; thus we think it is appropriate to allow 
foreclosure decisions to respond to other variables within the quarter. We place price 
changes second to last in our system. Within-quarter price shocks are not strongly 
correlated with foreclosure shocks (the correlation is -0.095, as shown in Table 2); 
allowing prices to follow the other three variables and precede foreclosures maximizes 
the extent to which contemporaneous price changes can reflect other influences within 
the quarter, while still allowing within-quarter foreclosures to respond to all other 
variables’ changes within the quarter. Allowing prices to come late in the ordering 
seemed appropriate given that a primary objective of our study is to bound the potential 
downward movements in home prices resulting from other shocks. If, alternatively, we 
place prices at the end of the ordering, with foreclosures immediately before, our results 
are similar to those reported below. 
The impulse responses (Figure 2) of the five endogenous variables to 
orthogonalized shocks that are identified by the recursive orthogonalization do not 
impose clear structural identifying restrictions. Still, it can be possible to connect 
observed impulse responses to structural influences in an intuitive way, based on the 
combination of observed patterns of response. For example, if a housing sales shock is 
associated with rising initial impulse responses for prices and permits, as in our study, 
that could be viewed as reflecting housing market demand-side influences.  In the same 
way, if a housing price shock is associated with positive sales and permits impulse 
responses, as in our study, that too could be viewed as indicative of housing market 
demand-side influences.  10 
Our impulse responses display a number of reassuring and robust tendencies: in 
particular, foreclosure shocks (increases in the quarterly log foreclosure rate that are 
unforecastable on the basis of lagged values of the five variables and contemporaneous 
values of the other four variables) predict declining employment and declining prices. 
Foreclosure shocks, however, are associated with increases in sales and permits. These 
impulse responses are somewhat puzzling, and may reflect the fact that foreclosure 
shocks are more likely to occur late in the down phase of a housing cycle.  
  The variance decompositions (Table 3) gauge the importance of shocks 
originating in the five endogenous variables for each of the five variables. For the most 
part, the variables do not contribute importantly to each other’s forecast variance, 
however, there are exceptions: sales and permits shocks are important for employment 
growth, employment shocks are important for foreclosures, and foreclosure shocks are 
important for all other variables, especially prices (foreclosure shocks explain 26 percent 
of the 20-quarter forecast variance of house price growth). 
 
IV. Bounding the Effects of Foreclosures on House Price Decline 
  In order to better illustrate and quantify the relationship between prices and 
foreclosures, we use the dynamic, quarterly, state-level model developed in Section III to 
generate out-of-sample forecasts of housing price changes, by state and for the country as 
a whole, for 2008 and 2009 (eight quarters beyond the end of our estimation sample).
3 As 
Figure 3 shows, there is substantial variation across states in each of the variables in our 
                                                 
3 As noted above, our model is estimated using data through the end of 2007Q4.  In our simulations we use 
actual 2008Q1 values (which are not in our estimation sample because of forward Helmert de-meaning) 
and then forecast future values through the end of 2009.   11 
model, which confirms the importance of taking account of state-level differences when 
forecasting price changes. 
  One approach to forecasting price changes would assume a zero-shock scenario 
for all five variables and derive implied housing prices using that scenario. We label this 
the “baseline” scenario. That scenario would be reasonable if one had no basis for 
believing that any of the five variables was likely to experience shocks going forward.  
Because our model is derived for de-meaned variables, we must add back the forecasted 
long-term mean to our simulated impulse responses in order to derive forward-looking 
estimates of the variables in our system; we assume that the forward-looking means are 
equal to the historical sample means of the variables. 
In our PVAR model, any anticipated shocks (based on knowledge not captured by 
the lagged variables in the model) that are expected to occur in 2008 and 2009 should be 
incorporated into the simulation exercise for that period. Given the change to much looser 
lending standards over the past decade − the credit extended with little or no 
documentation, and the spreading use of sub-prime and so-called Alt-A loans − there are 
legitimate reasons to believe that foreclosures could spike upwards substantially, and in 
excess of levels that would be forecast based on historical experience.  
Thus, the current “foreclosure crisis” provides a natural experiment for analyzing 
the broader relationship between foreclosures and home prices.  We incorporate estimates 
of these exogenous foreclosure shocks and allow our model to take into account feedback 
effects from these shocks on the other variables in our five-variable system. To take into 
account foreclosure shocks beyond those predicted by our model, we employ Mark 
Zandi’s “Economy.com” forecasts for quarterly foreclosures at the state level, which 12 
were kindly provided to us by him.
4 Note that because foreclosures appear last in the 
PVAR ordering, foreclosure shocks only affect the other variables with a lag.
5 After one 
quarter, all variables in the system are affected by foreclosure shocks, and in subsequent 
quarters, via the various channels that connect the five variables in our model.  
In our simulations, we do not incorporate shocks to the other four variables in our 
system.  We do this for two reasons.  First, and most importantly, the primary purpose of 
our paper is to isolate and highlight the impact that foreclosures have on home prices.  As 
a result, including additional shocks to sales or permits, for instance, would be counter 
productive to this goal.   
Second, from a pure contemporaneous forecasting perspective, we do not believe 
that there is a reasonable basis for assuming adverse shocks to employment, permits and 
home sales (that is, declines beyond what would be forecast from the data for 2006 and 
2007).  In our view, recent macroeconomic trends suggest that employment may be flat 
or improve in 2008-2009.  Judging from a longer-term perspective based on previous 
housing cycles (that is, adding information about the housing cycle not already captured 
by our PVAR model in growth rates), it appears that permits have likely bottomed out, 
having fallen for six quarters by a much larger amount than in previous housing cycles. 
On similar grounds, it would also be difficult to argue for anticipated negative house 
sales shocks going forward. Figure 4, Panel A, displays the long-term cyclical patterns of 
housing permits and sales for the nation as a whole since 1980. Figure 4, Panel B, reports 
residential construction relative to GDP, which is available for a much longer time frame. 
                                                 
4 We were provided forecasts of the seasonally-adjusted foreclosure start rate.  We used these data to 
predict the log levels of the outstanding foreclosure rate.  Details of this process are discussed in the 
appendix. 
5 As noted above, we did run our simulations using an ordering in which foreclosures appeared before 
prices and obtained virtually identical results to those reported here.   13 
These graphs show that, from the standpoint of the typical longer-term reversion of the 
growth of sales, permits, and residential construction, there is probably more reason to 
expect positive shocks (from the perspective of our PVAR model) in sales and permits 
than continuing negative shocks. 
Although we only report the results of one version of our model here – which 
defines foreclosures as the log foreclosure ratio, uses the comprehensive OFHEO all-
transactions price index, and begins the estimation period in 1981 – we also experimented 
with seven other versions of the model (which are available from the authors upon 
request). The eight versions we ran varied according to the definition of foreclosures (log 
ratio vs. log difference of the ratio), the definition of house prices (log difference of the 
OFHEO all-transactions index vs. log difference of the OFHEO purchase-only index), 
and the starting date chosen (1981 vs. 1988).  
Table 4 reports the cumulative simulated average US house price change from the 
second quarter of 2007 through the end of 2009 for each of the versions of the model, 
using the Economy.com implied foreclosure forecasts as shocks in the simulations. As 
Table 4 shows, the model that employs the comprehensive OFHEO all-transactions 
index, defines foreclosures as the log ratio, and begins the sample period in 1981 is the 
only model that results in a cumulative average price decline from 2007 to 2009 (-2.1 
percent).   
There are two reasons to prefer this model to the others. First, as we discuss 
further below, using the foreclosure ratio, rather than growth rate, appears to allow us to 
capture important nonlinear effects. Second, given that the thrust of our findings is the 
limited effects of foreclosure shocks on house prices, it seems desirable to be 14 
conservative by choosing the model that implies the largest price impact of foreclosure 
shocks. 
  One possible concern about the simulation results reported in Table 4 is that they 
are based on a linear model of the relationship between foreclosure growth and housing 
price change. The impact of foreclosures on prices may reflect nonlinear (or threshold) 
effects (that is, a rise in foreclosures when foreclosure rates are high may have a bigger 
effect on prices than a rise in foreclosures when foreclosure rates are low). This is a 
significant concern for our simulation, since the average foreclosure shock implied by the 
Economy.com forecasts for the 2008-2009 period raises the log of the foreclosure ratio 
by 0.22.  
While we cannot incorporate nonlinearities into our PVAR model directly, we can 
estimate the model’s house price equation on a stand-alone basis as a function of all of 
the variables already in our model plus the square of foreclosure growth for each of the 
eight lags of foreclosures included in the model, compare the effects of foreclosure 
shocks on prices in this quadratic form with the linear form already estimated (see the 
notes to Table 5 for a detailed description), and make adjustments to our simulated 
shocks as implied by the differences between the linear and nonlinear model.  
Table 5 reports the total effects at each lag of foreclosures on prices from the 
price equation, measured as the sum of linear and quadratic coefficients at each lag for 
the two foreclosure variables, evaluated at the mean of each state’s projected foreclosure 
rate for 2008-2009, using the foreclosure-shock scenario. These total effects are also 
graphed in Figure 5. This provides a comparison of the impact of foreclosure growth on 
price growth (excluding the feedback effects that would be present in the full PVAR 15 
model) for the quadratic and linear functional forms. We emphasize that because this 
stand-alone regression (unlike our PVAR model) does not allow feedback effects among 
the variables in the system, it only provides a rough gauge of the differences in impact of 
foreclosure shocks on prices under linear and nonlinear specifications. 
As Table 5 shows, the overall cumulative effects of the two functional forms are 
quite different; the quadratic version implies a 53 percent larger cumulative price decline 
from a foreclosure shock than the linear version. We interpret this to mean that taking 
into account nonlinear functional forms would produce greater simulated price declines 
than suggested by our linear model. To adjust for this nonlinear effect, we increase the 
Economy.com foreclosure forecasts by 53 percent. In our tables and figures we describe 
simulations derived from this assumed path of foreclosures as the “Foreclosure Shock” 
scenario. 
We also construct an “extreme-shock” scenario, which raises the Economy.com 
foreclosure projections by 75 percent rather than 53 percent. We regard this as a highly-
conservative scenario, since it implies actual foreclosure rates substantially greater than 
those that have been forecast by informed market participants, even after taking into 
account the effects of nonlinearity. 
  The predicted paths of foreclosures and prices, expressed both in growth rates and 
in levels, for the baseline, foreclosure-shock, and extreme-shock scenarios are presented 
graphically in Figure 6 for selected states and for the country as a whole.
6 The predicted 
paths of house prices vary by state significantly, which reflects differences both in states’ 
                                                 
6 Because our forecasts are state-level forecasts, the nationwide figures are the weighted-averages of the 
individual states, where weighting is based on the estimated number of housing units in each state (derived 
from annual estimates by the Bureau of the Census); in these calculations, Alaska and New Hampshire are 
excluded because of missing data for these states.   16 
experiences in recent years and their expected foreclosure shocks. Overall, none of the 
three scenarios predicts a severe decline in price for the nation as a whole. U.S. housing 
prices peak during our sample in the second quarter of 2007. The cumulative expected 
U.S. price changes between this peak and the end of 2009 under the three scenarios are 
-0.44 percent, -4.67 percent, and -5.47 percent, respectively.   
  As Figure 7 shows, even under the extreme-shock scenario, not only is the 
average price decline likely to be low for the country as a whole, but few states are 
projected to experience significant declines. Only twelve states are projected to 
experience cumulative declines from 2007Q2-2009Q4 of 6 percent or more – in order of 
severity according to projected decline: Nevada, Florida, California, Arizona, Michigan, 
Rhode Island, Minnesota, Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Hawaii and Indiana.  
  Why are housing prices so robust in the face of large foreclosure shocks? Our 
interpretation of these results is that foreclosure shocks do not have as large an effect on 
housing prices as simple graphs (such as Figure 1 above) might suggest. Furthermore, 
housing price growth is strongly mean reverting over the cycle, reflecting all the other 
dynamic interrelationships captured by our model. For example, it may not be surprising 
that shocks that have already produced one and a half years of low housing starts (which 
has substantially reduced the pipeline of supply for housing) might help to limit the 
extent of housing price decline going forward. 
We conclude that the effects of foreclosure shocks on prices may be much smaller 
than people have supposed. Even in the face of an extreme foreclosure wave such as that 17 
experienced in 2007, our evidence indicates that foreclosure shocks have relatively small 
effects on U.S. house prices.
7  
Our PVAR model estimates the effect of foreclosure shocks on prices by 
imposing the restriction that all states have similar vector autoregressive systems relating 
the five endogenous variables dynamically. We also investigated how our conclusions 
would differ if instead of imposing that restriction we estimated the relationships among 
the five endogenous variables separately for each state. Specifically, using quarterly data 
since 1981, and assuming eight quarterly lags for the five variables in our system, we 
estimated separate VAR models for each of the states. We then calculated impulse 
response functions from these VAR models, including impulse responses that examined 
the price consequences of foreclosure shocks.  
We regard these alternative estimates as relatively unreliable, since the small 
number of observations relative to estimated parameters results in little statistical power 
for state-specific VAR estimates. In fact, the estimated cumulative impulse responses of 
foreclosures on prices was positive for 16 of the 49 states for which we were able to 
calculate state-level VAR estimates, including several states with the most severe 
foreclosure shocks such as Florida, Michigan and Ohio.  Even so, our conclusion that 
foreclosure shocks have small price consequences is fairly robust to this alternative 
approach, with average U.S. price declines of only 4.5 percent between 2007Q2 and 
2009Q4 under our baseline scenario.
8   
                                                 
7 We also note that one disaggregated study of home price decline (OFHEO 2007b) found no evidence that, 
on average, neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates suffered greater price declines, ceteris paribus. 
8 In the state-by-state analysis, the baseline scenario is the only reliable and directly comparable forecasting 
scenario.  Given that 16 of the states had a positive cumulative price response to a foreclosure shock and 
another 15 had responses that were smaller in magnitude than our PVAR estimates, incorporating 
foreclosure shocks would likely raise prices compared to our baseline scenario.  Furthermore, it is not clear 
how to consistently adjust for possible nonlinearities in the state-by-state models.   18 
It is worth emphasizing that the unprecedented levels of foreclosure rates for the 
nation as a whole in early 2008 do not undermine the usefulness of our model for gauging 
the effects of foreclosures on prices. Because our estimates are derived from a model 
estimated at the state level, the domain of foreclosure values in our sample generally 
includes current observed levels. Indeed, for many of the states in our sample, the high 
2008Q1 foreclosure rate is not very different from previous peaks in that series (see 
Figure 3).  Moreover, Figure 8 demonstrates that while there are many states for which 
recent foreclosure rates are above their own historical experience, most of these do fall 
well within the range of foreclosure rates experienced over the panel as a whole (as 
shown by the average U.S. data on the right-hand side of the figure).  A key advantage of 
estimating the foreclosure-price relationship at the state level, rather than using 
nationwide time series, is the ability to estimate that relationship using a range of state-
level foreclosure experiences that include levels comparable to or greater than the high 
levels currently experienced in many states. Thus, our findings cannot be dismissed as 
out-of-sample estimates, despite the unprecedented high foreclosure rate for the country 
as a whole. 
    
V. Different Measures of Home Prices 
Our model uses the comprehensive OFHEO sales and refinancings (all-
transactions) index as our measure of house prices in each state in each quarter. Even a 
casual observer of data on home price movements in recent quarters will have noticed 
that there are several measures reported in the press, they are constructed differently and 
that they offer very different pictures of the changes in U.S. home prices. The measured 19 
declines in housing prices based on the comprehensive OFHEO index are much smaller 
from those of the Case-Shiller index and the median sales price of existing homes, and 
differ somewhat from the OFHEO purchase-only index (which excludes refinancings). Is 
the comprehensive OFHEO index we employ biased in some way that might affect our 
results?   
As we have already noted above, using the comprehensive OFHEO index results 
in a stronger price response to foreclosure shocks than using the purchase-only index. We 
also believe on a priori grounds that the comprehensive OFHEO index is the least biased 
concept of price to employ for the purposes of this study.
9  
Conceptually, changes in the median sale price of existing homes (reported by the 
National Association of REALTORS
®) is far inferior to the other measures, since it does 
not control for quality differences in homes over time (which introduces important 
potential biases if homes of different quality have a greater or lesser probability of being 
sold at different points in the cycle).  
The Case-Shiller index and the OFHEO indices are based on value comparisons 
over time for the same house. That is, a house only contributes to the index if and when a 
current transaction can be compared to a prior transaction. This avoids the need to try to 
control for home characteristics over time using a hedonic pricing model. There is still 
selectivity bias present in all the Case-Shiller and OFHEO indices, since the probability 
of a home with a given set of characteristics (e.g., lower value, poor condition, distressed 
seller, renovated recently) being sold may vary over time. For example, if sellers who sell 
early in the cycle are selling because they are being offered prices that are very high 
                                                 
9 It is noteworthy that central banks (e.g., the Fed and the Bank of Canada) also employ the OFHEO rather 
than the Case-Shiller index in their macroeconomic models of the U.S. economy, perhaps for some of the 
same reasons we enumerate here. 20 
(higher than fair value), or if sellers that sell late in the cycle (after the boom) 
systematically are eager to sell (and so underprice their homes compared to what a buyer 
with average patience would demand) that will make home prices appear more volatile 
than they actually are. The Case-Shiller and OFHEO purchase-only index potentially 
suffer much more from selectivity bias, since using only sales substantially reduces the 
number of observations used to construct the index (sales are about one third of the 
observations contained in the OFHEO sales and refinancings index, according to OFHEO 
2007a).  
The Case-Shiller index suffers from additional problems. Most obviously, it does 
not go back as far in time, and it does not cover the entire U.S. market. Leventis (2007) 
reports that the Case-Shiller index omits 13 states and has incomplete coverage of 
another 29 states. According to the 2006 American Community Survey estimates of the 
number of single-family, owner-occupied units in each state, the Case-Shiller national 
index entirely misses states with 11.28 percent of the housing stock, has only partial 
coverage in states containing 78.58 percent of the housing stock, and has full coverage 
for states with only 10.13 percent of the housing stock. Furthermore, the omitted parts of 
the U.S. market seem to be doing better than the included parts. As Figure 9 shows (see 
also Calomiris 2007), the omitted or incompletely covered regions have had a different 
and more positive experience from the complete coverage regions, according to the 
OFHEO data (which are similar in coverage across regions). 
It is also worth considering how the Case-Shiller and OFHEO indexes differ from 
the perspective of the macroeconomic relevance of the indexes. Some market 
commentators argue for using the Case-Shiller measure rather than the OFHEO measure 21 
on the grounds that Case-Shiller includes more houses actually undergoing foreclosure 
(since it includes homes financed by subprime mortgages). According to this argument, 
excluding subprime mortgages leads to too optimistic a view of home price change.  
This argument, however, confuses the observed price changes of houses placed on 
the market with changes in the housing wealth of consumers. Subprime borrowers 
typically invested very little wealth in their homes; thus, housing price decline related to 
subprime homes contributes little to housing wealth loss of consumers. The fact that a 
foreclosure results in a “fire sale” of a subprime house, per se, may have little effect on 
housing wealth of consumers. If, however, foreclosures drive down prices in the market 
generally, they could affect the housing wealth of non-subprime homeowners with 
substantial wealth invested in their homes. This is the wealth effect that should matter for 
consumption.
10 
Furthermore, both theoretical and empirical work suggest that the most important 
group of homeowners from the standpoint of the elasticity of consumption to home price 
change is young homeowners who have invested significant equity in their homes. This 
group is better captured by the OFHEO index, which does not include either subprime 
borrowers (many of whom have little wealth in their homes), or jumbo borrowers (who 
tend to be wealthier, older, and whose consumption should be less affected by borrowing 
constraints). The combination of including jumbo mortgages, and value-weighting 
homes, implies that the Case-Shiller index attaches substantial weight to the wealthiest 
homeowners.  
                                                 
10 A second argument sometimes made by advocates of employing the Case-Shiller index is that it exhibits 
a stronger negative correlation with foreclosures. This fact, however, even if true, is irrelevant from the 
standpoint of deciding which house price measure provides a better indicator of the consequences of a 
house wealth decline. 
 22 
From a theoretical standpoint, Buiter (2008) argues that there should be no house 
price wealth effects for consumption in the absence of market imperfections related to 
borrowing constraints.  This implies that consumption wealth effects related to house 
prices should be smaller than wealth effects of non-housing wealth, and should be 
relatively large for younger individuals with substantial wealth in their homes (the group 
whose house prices are best captured by the OFHEO index).  
As a result, the OFHEO index provides a better indicator of the representative 
American homeowner and captures the experience of the vast majority of American 
homeowners. Houses with conforming mortgages represent a large share of homes with 
mortgages. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, as of 2008Q1, subprime 
loans serviced represented 5.54 million of the 45.22 million mortgages serviced. Jumbo 
mortgages comprise fewer than 6 million mortgages. Together these facts imply that 
roughly three fourths of outstanding mortgages are conforming.
11 Perhaps with this in 
mind, macroeconomic modelers, including central banks, define house price wealth 
effects with respect to the OFHEO index. 
The magnitudes of house wealth effects are controversial, as there have been 
mixed results in the empirical literature regarding the existence and magnitude of any 
house price wealth effect. A major problem with empirical studies of the wealth effect is 
the use of current income, rather than hard-to-measure permanent income, alongside 
housing in the consumption equation; the interpretation of the coefficient on housing 
                                                 
11 Reliable data on the composition of mortgages by type are not readily available. According to OFHEO 
(http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/mortmarket1990to2004.pdf), 15 percent of the value of conventional 
(non-subprime) mortgage originations from 1990 to 2004 consisted of jumbos. Since jumbos, by definition, 
are larger than conforming loans, this implies that jumbo mortgages comprise less than 15 percent of the 
number of conventional mortgages originated. 23 
wealth is questionable, since house prices reflect and may serve as a proxy for anticipated 
future income of homeowners.  
The functional form of the wealth effect is also controversial. Recent work by 
Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), which employs the OFHEO index to measure 
consumption wealth effects of housing, suggests that such an effect does indeed exist, but 
that it is asymmetric. The authors find that while an increase in housing prices raises 
consumption, a decline has no significant effect.  This finding is especially relevant in 
light of concerns expressed over current falling house prices and consumption.  
A recent microeconomic study by Gan (2007) criticizes existing empirical studies 
of the housing wealth effect in the U.S. (which she argues suffer from poor data 
availability) and provides estimates of housing wealth effects on consumption based on 
the household behavior of Hong Kong residents (for whom better data are available). She 
finds a marginal propensity to consume from household wealth of 1.6 percent, on 
average, which is much smaller than the magnitude found in many other studies, and she 
finds that the wealth effect is driven entirely by the behavior of young people who 
substitute between housing wealth gains and precautionary savings from income. If Gan’s 
results generalize to the U.S., they imply that wealthier (older) homeowners have lower 
marginal propensities to consume out of their housing wealth, which implies a smaller 
prospective consumption decline per dollar of housing wealth decline in the U.S. today 
than if the decline in housing wealth were broad-based.  
We performed a simple regression analysis of consumption, in which we 
regressed consumption on its own lags as well as the current and past house price index, 
and found no significant relationship of house prices, whether the index is defined as the 24 
OFHEO or the Case-Shiller.  However, in terms of raw correlation, the OFHEO had a 
slightly higher correspondence to consumption than the Case-Shiller.   
We conclude from these theoretical and empirical perspectives that, from the 
standpoint of a macroeconomic interest in house prices, because the OFHEO index 
captures better the variation in wealth of households that are likely to display significant 
consumption responses to wealth, it is a better indicator of a possible consumption 
response than the Case-Shiller index.  
There is one aspect of the comprehensive OFHEO index which has received 
criticism. Since it employs refinancings, about two-thirds of the transactions included in 
the comprehensive index measure appraised value rather than sale value. In our view, this 
is not obviously an important problem. After all, banks rely on these appraisals to 
approve refinancings, often at very high leverage ratios. If appraisals for the purpose of 
refinancing were inaccurate, especially when leverage ratios are high, as in the U.S., 
lenders would be placed at significant risk. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4, relying on 
the purchase-only index has little effect on our results, and actually reduces simulated 
price effects in the wake of high foreclosures. This finding provides no support for the 
view that the comprehensive OFHEO index fails to measure price changes in response to 
changing market conditions. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our study is the first to model the high-frequency dynamic relationships among 
house prices, foreclosures, employment, house permits, and house sales. We do so using 
a PVAR model at the state level for the United States for the period 1981-2007.  25 
We offer the following summary of our findings:  
(1) It is important to take account of the enormous variation across states, which 
facilitates identification of links among variables.  
(2) Foreclosures and prices are closely associated at low frequency, but that 
reflects a combination of linkages, not just the effects of foreclosure shocks on prices.  
(3) Our PVAR model is able to identify the dynamic relations among the key 
housing market variables and the macroeconomy, taking advantage of the high degree of 
variation in the experiences of different states over the past two decades. The identified 
relationships make sense, and the variables explain a large amount of each other’s 
forecast variance. 
(4) We quantify the relatively small effect foreclosures have on house prices by 
combining our PVAR model and Economy.com forecasted foreclosure rates for 2008 and 
2009.  After considering possible biases relating to nonlinearity in the foreclosure-price 
relationship, we conservatively (over-)estimate that the national average price decline for 
houses from the 2007:Q2 peak to 2009:Q4 will be roughly 5.5 percent. We conclude that 
a reasonable estimate of the future path of U.S. housing market prices is that they will 
remain essentially flat, on average, for the next two years, notwithstanding the large 
predicted increase in foreclosures. 
(5) We argue that, from a variety of perspectives, the OFHEO comprehensive 
measure of price change that we employ is the appropriate index of housing prices for our 
purposes. It is important for readers of our study to recognize that our measure of house 
price change (the comprehensive OFHEO index) has produced less volatile house price 
changes in the past, and has declined much less than the Case-Shiller or median sales 26 
indices in recent times. We argue that the comprehensive OFHEO index provides a more 
reliable picture of the representative house in each of the states, and a more important 
picture of the housing market from the standpoint of consumption wealth effects.  
Needless to say, we do not have a crystal ball. Our estimates are based on 
relationships among house prices, foreclosures, and other variables observed in the past. 
It is conceivable that unusually tight consumer credit conditions, or other factors, could 
weigh on the housing market and produce more price decline than we estimate. Such a 
decline, however, would reflect a continuing sales shock, not the impact of foreclosures.  
Our estimates provide a useful benchmark. Based on the past experience of the housing 
cycle, even when one proverbially bends over backwards to inflate estimated foreclosures 
and take account of possible nonlinearities in their effects on house prices, there is no 
reasonable basis from past empirical relationships for believing (as many commentators 
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Table 1 − Panel VAR Regression Results 
Employment Sales    Permits    Prices  Foreclosures 
Employment          
L1 0.399702  *** 1.162652*  3.990796**  -0.019136    -2.140017** 
  (0.039863)   (0.503227) (1.418862)  (0.089524)   (0.713470) 
L2 0.202720  *** 0.613139  2.893245**  -0.112046    -0.557794 
  (0.028122)   (0.440973) (1.051846)  (0.079807)   (0.700723) 
L3 0.098326  ***  -0.359233  1.064496  -0.043000    -0.366241 
  (0.025349)   (0.484226) (0.968182)  (0.075616)   (0.758493) 
L4 -0.123412  *** -0.186061  -1.434417  0.204454  *  -0.182663 
  (0.022480)   (0.448507) (1.052604)  (0.083746)   (0.611040) 
L5  0.019607   0.194391 1.976591*  -0.086341    -0.386291 
  (0.021092)   (0.439694) (0.866468)  (0.072642)   (0.633853) 
L6 0.015775    -0.687481  1.401577  0.027847    1.941353** 
  (0.017836)   (0.394824) (0.824182)  (0.073159)   (0.666763) 
L7  0.023390   0.508244 1.546669*  -0.108545   0.640251 
  (0.017252)   (0.378845) (0.693752)  (0.066934)   (0.604947) 
L8 -0.048962  **  -0.188016  0.582125  0.016060    0.015795 
  (0.016850)   (0.346061) (0.618150)  (0.080704)   (0.519287) 
S a l e s           
L1 0.002839  ***  -0.251266*** 0.262331*** 0.002941    -0.102247** 
  (0.000838)   (0.026617) (0.044184)  (0.003074)   (0.032113) 
L2 0.003780  ***  -0.104449*** 0.261145*** 0.005685    -0.020384 
  (0.000963)   (0.022991) (0.054765)  (0.003583)   (0.032303) 
L3 0.000698    -0.070913**  0.270109*** 0.004653    -0.009800 
  (0.000888)   (0.023058) (0.051457)  (0.003934)   (0.030680) 
L4  0.000187   0.023803 0.123732**  -0.001243    -0.021280 
  (0.000869)   (0.021743) (0.039150)  (0.003403)   (0.030117) 
L5  0.000004   0.016779 0.124148**  0.006944  *  -0.024590 
  (0.000846)   (0.022322) (0.038734)  (0.003471)   (0.030444) 
L6 0.000208    0.059451**  0.124981*  0.001861    -0.029940 
  (0.000779)   (0.020823) (0.048806)  (0.003277)   (0.032343) 
L7  0.000952   0.036284 0.126146**  0.001671   0.027349 
  (0.000727)   (0.021388) (0.047891)  (0.003308)   (0.027698) 
L8  0.000964    -0.003179 0.072283 -0.000604   0.030441 
  (0.000739)   (0.020301) (0.041591)  (0.003537)   (0.029753) 30 
Table 1 − Panel VAR Regression Results 
Employment Sales    Permits    Prices  Foreclosures 
Permits          
L1 0.002041  *** 0.056678*** -0.291377*** 0.004630  *  -0.046834***
  (0.000557)   (0.014339) (0.073095)  (0.002033)   (0.014107) 
L2 0.001724  *  0.042428*** -0.144466*  0.003465    -0.060820***
  (0.000742)   (0.009921) (0.068179)  (0.002010)   (0.017195) 
L3 0.002488  *** 0.033093** -0.011806  0.001152    -0.050186** 
  (0.000705)   (0.010429) (0.075987)  (0.001834)   (0.017780) 
L4 0.002065  ***  -0.003555  -0.019940  0.000975    -0.034131* 
  (0.000572)   (0.012282) (0.065399)  (0.001990)   (0.016307) 
L5 0.002380  ***  -0.008470  0.034723  0.003481  *  -0.034792* 
  (0.000653)   (0.012470) (0.055328)  (0.001711)   (0.017081) 
L6 0.001399  *  0.002749  -0.050021  0.001694    -0.036844* 
  (0.000587)   (0.010458) (0.071671)  (0.002045)   (0.018101) 
L7  0.000105   -0.015840 -0.209010* 0.003753  *  -0.016502 
  (0.000538)   (0.010254) (0.085817)  (0.001816)   (0.014060) 
L8  -0.000313   -0.019454 -0.137440* 0.001623   -0.013375 
  (0.000485)   (0.013214) (0.067634)  (0.001726)   (0.012845) 
Prices          
L1 -0.005459    0.864046*** 1.607469*** 0.025877    -0.910381***
  (0.005879)   (0.130032) (0.293966)  (0.045860)   (0.197272) 
L2 0.008598    0.423651**  1.113285*** 0.103935  *  -0.234117 
  (0.006103)   (0.130021) (0.330080)  (0.046908)   (0.222452) 
L3  -0.009180   0.223636 0.774800**  0.119899  *  -0.617658** 
  (0.005374)   (0.133897) (0.246822)  (0.050414)   (0.187955) 
L4  -0.008067   0.178210 0.901444*** 0.106964  **  -0.291176 
  (0.005329)   (0.112789) (0.238550)  (0.036857)   (0.184257) 
L5 -0.009734  *  0.121851  0.604186**  0.051992    -0.149291 
  (0.004558)   (0.092479) (0.201100)  (0.055007)   (0.147804) 
L6 -0.009610  *  0.087539  0.566473**  0.018389    0.003648 
  (0.004107)   (0.093601) (0.195867)  (0.034494)   (0.138890) 
L7 -0.010670  **  0.191847*  0.800464*** 0.025357    0.136487 
  (0.003811)   (0.094654) (0.209222)  (0.039030)   (0.145194) 
L8 -0.004322    -0.029736  0.595480*** -0.002022    -0.005777 
  (0.003104)   (0.087292) (0.153848)  (0.021523)   (0.122687) 31 
Table 1 − Panel VAR Regression Results 
Employment Sales    Permits    Prices  Foreclosures 
Foreclosures          
L1 -0.002593  ***  0.023659  0.108690*** -0.010422  ***  0.716992***
  (0.000549)   (0.013815) (0.024006)  (0.002195)   (0.035988) 
L2 0.000344    0.031819*  0.037476  0.001860    0.207630***
  (0.000583)   (0.013501) (0.020373)  (0.002544)   (0.048615) 
L3  0.001485  **  -0.008694 0.009482 -0.003261   0.061486 
  (0.000532)   (0.014999) (0.017300)  (0.002790)   (0.045232) 
L4 -0.001259  *  -0.007781  0.012388  0.001742    0.057642 
  (0.000579)   (0.014683) (0.019610)  (0.002372)   (0.039978) 
L5  0.000594   0.011557 0.003807  0.002597    -0.008396 
  (0.000578)   (0.014300) (0.018908)  (0.002802)   (0.031446) 
L6  -0.000457   -0.010606 -0.038180* -0.001816   -0.056287 
  (0.000579)   (0.014848) (0.019234)  (0.002518)   (0.031975) 
L7  0.000166   -0.023710 -0.022152  0.002657    0.039016 
  (0.000550)   (0.014258) (0.019304)  (0.002859)   (0.033826) 
L8 0.000590    0.002107  -0.028833  0.005709    -0.084044** 
  (0.000547)   (0.012584) (0.018870)  (0.003214)   (0.030750) 
Notes:  Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the regression coefficients.   
  *** Coefficient significant at the 0.1% level. 
  ** Coefficient significant at the 1% level. 
  * Coefficient significant at the 5% level.   
  The variables used in the analysis are as follows:  
•  Employment − Growth rate (log difference) of the quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted 
monthly total non-farm employment for the state.   
•  Sales − Growth rate (log difference) of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate of existing home sales 
for the state in the quarter.   
•  Permits − Growth rate (log difference) of the quarterly average of the seasonally-adjusted number 
of monthly single-family residential building permits for the state.   
•  Prices − Growth rate (log difference) of the quarterly OFHEO house price index (all transactions) 
for the state.   
•  Foreclosures − Log level of the MBA quarterly foreclosure inventory as a percent of loans serviced 
for the state.     
  All regression variables were de-meaned using a Helmert transformation, while the actual values of the 
variables were used as instruments to obtain consistent estimates.   32 
 
 
Table 2 – Residuals Correlation Matrix 
 Employment  Sales  Permits  Prices  Foreclosures
Employment  1 
       
Sales  0.0500 
(0.0000) 
1 
      





    







   










Notes:  All variables are Helmert de-meaned log differences of levels except for foreclosures, which is 
the (de-meaned) log foreclosure rate (see the notes on Table 1 and the appendix for a complete 




Table 3 – Variance Decompositions 
 Lag  Employment  Sales  Permits  Prices  Foreclosures 
Employment 4 0.9306  0.0281 0.0283 0.0026  0.0104 
  8 0.8311  0.0690 0.0794 0.0063  0.0142 
  20 0.7716  0.1002 0.0790 0.0351  0.0141 
Sales  4 0.0046  0.9626 0.0123 0.0162  0.0044 
  8 0.0062  0.9505 0.0145 0.0223  0.0065 
  20 0.0062  0.9476 0.0156 0.0238  0.0067 
Permits  4 0.0130  0.0645 0.8953 0.0167  0.0104 
  8 0.0186  0.0661 0.8675 0.0317  0.0160 
  20 0.0201  0.0668 0.8612 0.0352  0.0167 
Prices  4 0.0005  0.0082 0.0053 0.9642  0.0218 
  8 0.0085  0.0258 0.0192 0.9070  0.0396 
  20 0.0129  0.0439 0.0255 0.8788  0.0389 
Foreclosures 4 0.0353  0.0173 0.0122 0.0443  0.8909 
  8 0.0627  0.0512 0.0425 0.1024  0.7412 
  20 0.0795  0.1197 0.0712 0.2564  0.4731 




Table 4 – Cumulative Simulated U.S. House Price Changes between 2007Q2 
and 2009Q4 by Model Version Assuming Foreclosures Follow Economy.com 
Forecasts 
Log Level of 
Foreclosure Rate 
Log Difference of  
Foreclosure Rate  Price Data Used 
1981-2007 1988-2007 1981-2007  1988-2007 
OFHEO all-transactions index -2.1%  +0.1%  +6.1%  +5.5% 
OFHEO purchase-only index  +3.0%  +2.8%  +2.1%  +2.2% 
Notes:  Eight different versions of the model were run based on the choice of data start point (1981 vs. 1988), price 
data used (OFHEO all-transactions index vs. purchase-only index), and foreclosure variable used (log level 
of the foreclosure rate vs. the log difference of the foreclosure rate).  Table entries report the cumulative 
simulated house price changes for the U.S. as a whole between 2007Q2 and 2009Q4 resulting from 




Table 5 – Difference in the Effect of a Change in the Foreclosure Rate on 
Home Price Appreciation using Linear and Quadratic Specifications 






0 -0.00271  -0.00320  18.14 
1 -0.00074  0.00041  -155.04 
2 0.00089  -0.00100 -212.18 
3 -0.00051  -0.00004  -92.18 
4 0.00048  0.00185  285.80 
5 0.00057  -0.00010 -117.64 
6 -0.00050  -0.00050  -0.74 
7 0.00077  0.00058  -24.77 
8 0.00115  0.00108  -6.51 
Cumulative -0.00060  -0.00092  53.26 
Notes:  Cumulative effects are the sum of all the lags, and represent the effect of a mean value (0.22) shock 
that persists for nine periods.  These effects are graphed in Figure 5.   
  Explanation of Table 5:  The entries above were calculated as follows.  For the second column 
(Linear Specification), fixed-effect panel regressions of the HPI growth rate on eight lags of all five 
system variables along with contemporaneous values of the four exogenous variables were run.  As 
in the text, fixed effects were controlled for by Helmert de-meaning the data, while the actual 
values of the variables were used as instruments to obtain consistent estimates.  The column 2 
values are then derived by taking the coefficients for each lag of the log foreclosure rate and 
multiplying them by 0.22, the mean value of the de-meaned log foreclosure rate derived from the 
Economy.Com implied foreclosure forecast.  Thus, the table entries represent the total impact on 
the HPI growth rate from a mean value shock in the log level of the foreclosure rate the specified 
number of periods in the past.   
  For column 3 (Quadratic Specification), a quadratic term on the log foreclosure rate is included in 
the above panel regression.  The values in this column are calculated in a similar fashion, providing 
an estimate of the total price impact (both linear and quadratic) of a mean value shock to the growth 
rate of foreclosures.   
  The final column is the percentage difference between the second and third column; a positive 
number indicates that a foreclosure shock has a bigger price impact under a quadratic specification 
than it does with a linear specification.   
  Detailed regression results for both the Linear and Quadratic Specifications are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Percentage Change in OFHEO HPI - 2006Q4 to 2007Q4
Figure 1: Annual Change in OFHEO HPI
vs. Change in Foreclosure Rate
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Response of lfor to lfor shock
Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions
 
Note:  Impulse responses are based on growth rates (difference of logs) of all variables in the system except the foreclosure rate, which is modeled as a log level.  
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Figure 4 - Panel A: Single-Family Permits and Sales
Relative to Housing Stock
 
 
Figure 4: Panel B
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Lag
Linear Specification Quadratic Specification
Figure 5: Effect of Foreclosures on Home Prices
 
Note:  Lines show the total impact of a mean value (0.22) log foreclosure rate shock on 
the HPI growth rate at the specified lag if the impact of foreclosures is modeled 
using the indicated specification.  A detailed description of their calculation is 














































































































Figure 6 - Panel A: Foreclosures Growth Rate Simulations in Selected States
 
Note: The variable graphed in this panel is the quarterly log difference of the percent of mortgages in foreclosure; the Entire U.S. forecasts are the weighted 
average of the state forecasts, where weighting is based on the estimated housing stock in each state. The Foreclosure Shock scenario is based on Economy.com 
forecasts, adjusted for possible non-linear effects.  The Extreme Foreclosure Shock scenario assumes foreclosures are 75 percent higher than those in the 











































































































































Figure 6 - Panel B: HPI Growth Rate Simulations in Selected States
 
Note: The variable graphed in this panel is the quarterly log difference of the OFHEO HPI (all-transactions index); the Entire U.S. forecasts are the weighted 
average of the state forecasts, where weighting is based on the estimated housing stock in each state.  The Foreclosure Shock scenario is based on Economy.com 
forecasts, adjusted for possible non-linear effects.  The Extreme Foreclosure Shock scenario assumes foreclosures are 75 percent higher than those in the 































































































Figure 6 - Panel C: Foreclosure Rate Simulations in Selected States
 
Note: The variable graphed in this panel is the percent of mortgages in foreclosure; the Entire U.S. forecasts are the weighted average of the state forecasts, 
where weighting is based on the estimated housing stock in each state.  The Foreclosure Shock scenario is based on Economy.com forecasts, adjusted for 

































































































































































Figure 6 - Panel D: HPI Simulations in Selected States
 
Note: The variable graphed in this panel is the OFHEO HPI (all transactions index) for each state, renormalized to set 2008q1 = 100; the Entire U.S. forecasts are 
the weighted average of the state forecasts, where weighting is based on the estimated housing stock in each state.  The Foreclosure Shock scenario is based on 
Economy.com forecasts, adjusted for possible non-linear effects.  The Extreme Foreclosure Shock scenario assumes foreclosures are 75 percent higher than those 
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Extreme Foreclosure Shock
Figure 7: Distribution of Total House Price
Changes between 2007Q2 and 2009Q4
 
Note:  Alaska and New Hampshire are not included because of data limitations; the 































































































Figure 8: Current Foreclosure Rate vs. Historical Values
 
Notes:  The bars show the range of historical foreclosure rate values (1
st through 99
th percentiles) for each state between 1979 and 2005; the historical mean 
and 75
th percentile figures are calculated using this same time frame.  The red diamonds show the most recent foreclosure rate for the state.  U.S. 
average values are found on the right, and represent the simple average of the states (not the U.S. aggregate figures as reported by the MBA).  Note that 
many states with 2008Q1 foreclosure rates outside their own historical experiences are well within the range of the other states within the panel, 
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States with Full Coverage
States with Partial Coverage
States with No Coverage
Disaggregated by Case-Shiller Coverage
Figure 9: OFHEO HPI
 
Note:  This figure shows the weighted-average of OFHEO state-level price indices 
aggregated on whether the states are covered in the Case-Shiller national house 
price index.  Weighting is based on the estimated number of housing units in each 
state according to the 2006 American Community Survey.   
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Prices Variant 1:  OFHEO All-Transactions House Price Indices 
  Our primary home price appreciation measure comes from the state-level, all-
transactions house price indices produced by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO).  We use the 2008Q1 release of these data, which include 
observations from 1975Q1 through 2008Q1.  We renormalize these indices to set 2008Q1 
as the base quarter.  All of our regressions measure home price appreciation as the log 
difference of these indices, not seasonally adjusted. 
Prices Variant 2:  OFHEO Purchase Only House Price Indices 
  In our robustness checks, we make use of the 2008Q1 release of the OFHEO 
purchase-only indices.  For regressions requiring observations prior to 1991Q1 (the 
beginning point of the purchase-only indices), we join the purchase-only index with the 
corresponding all-transactions index (both renormalized to 1991Q1) to provide full 
coverage through the entire sample period.  The resulting spliced indices are then 
normalized to set 2008Q1 as the base quarter.  Once again, appreciation is measured as 
the log difference of this series, not seasonally adjusted.   
Foreclosures:  Foreclosure Rate 
  Historical values of the foreclosure rate come from the Mortgage Bankers 
Association (MBA) Quarterly Delinquency Survey, which provides the number of 
mortgage loans in foreclosure as a percent of all loans serviced.  These data run from 
1979Q1 through 2008Q1 and are not seasonally adjusted. 52 
  We use the log level of the foreclosure rate in our primary regression 
specifications, although in our robustness checks we also run specifications that use the 
log difference of the foreclosure rate.   
  In the “Foreclosure Shock” and “Extreme Foreclosure Shock” scenarios, 
forecasted values of the foreclosure rate are derived as follows.  We obtained state-level 
historical (2007Q4 and earlier) and forecasted (2008Q1 and later) values of seasonally-
adjusted foreclosure starts (the percent of mortgages entering into foreclosure during the 
quarter) from Economy.com.  On a state-by-state basis, we regressed the log level of the 
MBA foreclosure rate on four lags of itself and the contemporaneous value and four lags 
of the log level of the foreclosure start rate.  Using the estimated coefficients from these 
regressions and the Economy.com forecasts of the foreclosure start rate, we dynamically 
predicted the log level of the foreclosure rate in each state through the end of 2009.  
Copies of the regression output for each state and graphs depicting actual and predicted 
values from this exercise are available from the authors upon request.   
  Note that because forecasts of the foreclosure start rate were not available for 
Alaska, we were unable to include Alaska in any of our simulations.     
Permits Variant 1:  Single-family Residential Building Permits, 1988-2007 Data 
  The Bureau of the Census prepares a monthly release of building permits by state 
(not seasonally adjusted); these are available back to January 1988.  For our 1988-2007 
regressions, we seasonally adjusted each monthly state series using the Census X12 
program using default settings.  We then calculated the quarterly average of these figures.  
All of our regressions measure the growth rate of permits as the log difference of these 
quarterly averages.   53 
Permits Variant 2:  Single-family Residential Building Permits, 1981-2007 Data 
  Economy.com provided us with monthly, seasonally-adjusted, annualized rate of 
single-family building permits by state dating back to January 1980.  According to 
Economy.com, the original raw data that underlie these series come from the Bureau of 
the Census.  As noted above, the raw (non-seasonally adjusted monthly figures) are 
available from the Bureau of the Census dating to 1988, although these data are 
incomplete in that they do not include all permitting offices that are included in the 
annual series.
12  For observations between 1980 and 1988, Economy.com derived the 
monthly values based on the annual data reported by the Bureau of the Census.   
  In our primary results, we use the quarterly average of these monthly data as our 
measure of permits.  All of our regressions measure the growth rate of permits as the log 
difference of these quarterly averages.  Because permits are zero in some states for some 
quarters (most notably the District of Columbia), we added one to each of the quarterly 
permit values before taking logs.   
Employment:  Total Non-farm Employment  
  Total non-farm employment by state (not seasonally adjusted) is available from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics dating back to 1960.  We seasonally adjusted each monthly 
state series using the Census X12 program using default settings.
13  We then calculated 
the quarterly average of these figures.  All of our regressions measure the growth rate of 
employment as the log difference of these quarterly averages.    
                                                 
12 These unadjusted data are also problematic because the permit issuing places included in the series 
change over time.   
13 The BLS also provides seasonally-adjusted employment data; these data are only available back to 1990, 
however.   54 
Sales:  Single-family Existing Home Sales 
  The monthly, seasonally-adjusted annual rate of existing, single-family home 
sales for each state is available from the National Association of REALTORS®.  These 
data are available dating back to the beginning of 1981.   
  One quarter’s observation was missing for Indiana and three were missing for 
Idaho.  In order to keep these states in our simulation (the missing quarters occur in 2006, 
within our simulation forecast window), we interpolated values based on the growth rates 
of existing home sales in neighboring states.  Specifically, we assumed that the growth 
rate (percentage change from the prior quarter) in Indiana in the missing quarter was 
equal to the average growth rate in Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio.  The missing 
value is then calculated as this average growth rate applied to the prior period sales in 
Indiana.  Similarly, missing values in Idaho are interpolated based on the average sales 
growth rate in Montana, Wyoming and Utah.
14 
  Finally, note that no sales are reported for New Hampshire between 2004Q1 and 
2007Q4.  As a result, this state was excluded from our analysis.   
 
PVAR Methodology 
  Because of the lagged dependent variables inherent in a PVAR model, we follow 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and de-mean our variables using Helmert’s transformation: 
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14 Washington and Oregon were excluded here because they were deemed to be “Pacific” states rather than 
“Mountain” states and thus less comparable for Idaho.   55 
where  ) 1 /( ) (
2 + − − = t T t T wt .  In other words, each of the first T − 1 observations are 
de-meaned using all future observations (with the next-to-last observation demeaned by 
the final observation, which is lost from the sample).  The weighting 
2
t w  is included to 
equalize the variances.   
  Consistent parameter estimates then be obtained by using two-stage least squares 
on these transformed variables, using the non-transformed values of the variables as 
instruments.  We performed out estimation in Stata, using a PVAR program provided by 
Inessa Love with the World Bank.   
 
 